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Abstract
This article1 introduces a triangular model to study small and medium en-
terprises (SMEs) in Malaysia by examining three points, namely the state, 
economy and society. It discusses how and why the government has changed 
the nation's economic development strategies over time in response to the 
changing global economy. Within the context of these development strategies, 
the article describes how and explains why Chinese and Bumiputera (Malays 
and indigenous people in Malaysia) SMEs, and civil societies responded to 
these changes. It provides analysis on how these development strategies have 
shaped the development of Chinese and Bumiputera SMEs at different periods 
in the nation's economic development. It argues that prolonged pro-distributive 
policies have negative effects on the competitiveness of the nation's economy. 
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Introduction 
In this article I develop a triangular model to provide a holistic approach 
to study SMEs in Malaysia. The three points in the model are the state, 
economy and society. For the state, the evolution of Malaysia's develop-
ment strategies from 1971 to the present is analyzed. These development 
strategies include the New Economic Policy (NEP, 1971–1990), National 
Development Policy (NDP, 1991–2000), National Vision Policy (NVP, 
2001–2010) and the current New Economic Model (NEM, introduced in 
2009). It examines how and why certain economic policies were imple-
mented in response to changes in the domestic and global economy. In 
this regard, I take the position that the nation-state plays a rightful role in 
the globalization process as argued by Henderson (1989) and Weiss (1998) 
because government initiatives can inﬂuence and attract investment. 
As for the economy, the article analyzes responses from Chinese 
SMEs2 and Bumiputera to these development strategies and to the 
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changing domestic and global economy. It analyzes how the Chinese 
business community responded to the NEP and how the NEP shaped 
the size and direction of Chinese SMEs in the 1970s and 1980s and how 
Bumiputera responded to 'new business opportunities'. It also examines 
how and why the Chinese business community responded positively 
to the government's initiatives to encourage business partnerships to 
expedite the formation of the Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial 
Community (BCIC) during the NDP and NVP periods. I substantiate 
my argument by providing empirical case studies to explain how Chi-
nese–Bumiputera partnerships work and why Chinese entrepreneurs 
responded to this form of partnership. For the period during the NEM, 
I focus on SMEs in the electrical and electronic (E&E) manufacturing 
industry, as it is the leading industry in Malaysia's manufacturing 
sector. The E&E industry has been identiﬁed as Malaysia's strength. 
Thus it is strategic to leverage on its existing infrastructures to sustain 
Malaysia's leadership position in the E&E supply chains, which are 
highly competitive and globally integrated (Malaysia 2010: 11). How-
ever, Malaysia is facing the challenge to improve industrial policy for 
this sector to attract private capital investment and develop, retain and 
recruit talent to ensure the industry's competitiveness. Drawing from 
two case studies in the E&E sector, the article discusses constraints and 
challenges, and how entrepreneurs deal with the shortage of talent and 
skilled workers that have resulted from long-standing pro-distributive 
government policies and the changing global economy. 
As for civil societies, the article examines how and why different 
ethnic-based civil societies responded differently to these development 
strategies. Civil societies in this study include non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) such as chambers of commerce and protest move-
ments. The article examines the responses of the Associated Chinese 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Malaysia (ACCCIM)3 to the 
above-mentioned economic policies. For the period of the NEP, I show 
how the ACCCIM responded and why they were so hostile towards the 
NEP. I also show that the ACCCIM held a different stance and took a 
pro-active role during the NDP and NVP periods in responding to the 
government's initiatives to encourage its members to form smart part-
nerships with Bumiputera. I explain why ACCCIM took such a stance. 
For the NEM period, I examine the policy, describe how and explain 
why the ACCCIM responded positively to the NEM. I also describe how 
and explain why Malay civil society represented by Perkasa (Pertubuhan 
Pribumi Perkasa, a Malay nationalist organization) responded negatively 
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to the formulation and implementation of the NEM in late 2009 and 
early 2010. These two ethnic-based civil society groups have great inﬂu-
ence on the formulation of the country's economic policies. ACCCIM 
is a national organization and by default it is a representative for SMEs 
since most of its members are SMEs. On the other hand, Perkasa has 
great inﬂuence over 76 Malay NGOs throughout Malaysia.
I analyze the innovativeness of the state and civil society (ACCCIM 
and Perkasa, in this context), in which they inﬂuence each other in the 
formulation and implementation of economic policies that are needed 
to address problems and issues and enhance the competitiveness of 
SMEs in a challenging global economy. As I examine the current sce-
nario of Malaysian SMEs from the triangular model, I argue that the 
development and success of the nation's economy depends heavily on 
the effectiveness of pro-growth economic policies, such as the NEM. As 
Malaysia is now at the crossroads by embarking on the NEM, the state, 
SMEs and civil societies have to reinvent themselves to be relevant in 
the global economy. 
The New Economic Policies, Responses from Chinese 
Civil Society and Chinese SMEs
Subsequent to communal riots on 13 May 1969, the Malaysian govern-
ment implemented the NEP in 1971 with the primary aim of restruc-
turing society 'to reduce and eventually eliminate the identiﬁcation 
of race with economic function'. Its ultimate goal was to facilitate 'the 
emergence of a full-ﬂedged Malay entrepreneurial community within 
one generation', and to achieve a 30 per cent Bumiputera ownership of 
the corporate sector by 1990. In accordance with the afﬁrmative action 
policy, ethnic quotas were introduced. Consequently, Bumiputera were 
favoured when it came to the awarding of government contracts, ten-
der, loans and credit. The policy would maintain the ratio of corporate 
capital ownership of non-Bumiputera at 40 per cent and that of foreign 
corporate capital at 30 per cent, compared with 63.4 per cent in 1970. The 
NEP is basically a policy about promoting distribution, more speciﬁcally 
inter-ethnic redistribution, rather than growth (Jomo 1994: 16).
Under the NEP, one of the regulations that aroused much controversy 
was the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) of 1975. The act imposed a 
licensing system on manufacturing ﬁrms that empowered the Minister 
of Trade and Industry to impose conditions to serve 'national interest' 
(Jesudason 1989: 131). Business ﬁrms with more than RM100,000 in 
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shareholders' funds and more than 25 workers were to ensure that Bumi-
putera made up 30 per cent of the workforce and held 30 per cent of the 
equity. The Chinese business community represented by the ACCCIM 
perceived the ICA as an instrument that undermined the basis of the 
Chinese business system, particularly the family business that formed 
the majority of Chinese enterprise. In 1971, typical Chinese family busi-
nesses formed 65 per cent of the total manufacturing establishments 
(Jesudason 1989: 139). It was obvious that almost all Chinese family 
businesses would come under the jurisdiction of the ICA. Naturally, 
the Chinese business community felt threatened and questioned why 
they would have to give up a substantial part of their family business 
that they had built diligently over the years to Malay 'partners'. Sens-
ing the long-term implications of the ruling, ACCCIM led the Chinese 
business community in a campaign objecting to the ICA, as it argued 
that the Act was aimed primarily at the Chinese business community 
(Jesudason 1989; Hara 1991; Yasuda 1991).  
ACCCIM then lobbied for support to persuade the private sector to 
adopt its position to seek the repeal of the ICA. However, it failed to 
secure the support of the Malaysian International Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry, the National Chamber of Commerce and the Malay 
Chambers of Commerce. The Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers 
took an intermediate position and recommended that the cut-off point 
for exempting ﬁrms from the ICA be raised to RM1 million in share-
holder funds (Jesudason 1989: 140). Ultimately the government amended 
the ICA in April 1977 to exempt ﬁrms with less than RM250,000 in 
shareholder funds and RM500,000 in ﬁxed investment from the equity 
condition. It was only in 1986 that the limit of RM1 million in invested 
capital received ofﬁcial sanction.  
The ACCCIM veers away from politics but insists on safeguarding 
the economic interests of its members and the business community. To 
play this role, it has found it necessary to exert its inﬂuence on certain 
government policies. Politically, Chinese-based political parties such 
as the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Gerakan, which are 
coalition partners in the government, have lost much of their inﬂuence 
and are not able to act from a position of strength, as they have gone 
through internal crisis. The ACCCIM seeks to minimize the impact of 
the declining political clout of the Chinese by ﬁlling that vacuum with 
its actions. In 1978, during the conference of the Associated Chinese 
Chambers of Commerce, the ACCCIM made known its displeasure with 
government bureaucrats for their poor performance and for wasting 
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public funds, and voiced the opinion that the NEP was bringing only 
transitory gains for some Malays (Jesudason 1989: 133).
Under the ICA, well-connected Bumiputera were given privileged ac-
cess to manufacturing and other 'traditional sectors' in Chinese business, 
such as construction, trade and transportation. In the late 1980s, when 
the Malaysian economy went into recession affecting the state-owned 
enterprises, an economic liberalization policy was adopted. This led to 
the privatization and Malaysia Incorporation policy under which various 
state assets were transferred to Bumiputera individuals and interests 
(Gomez & Jomo 1999; Searle 1999). In the face of state intervention to 
advance Bumiputera interests in both the corporate and the SME sectors, 
Chinese entrepreneurs responded in various ways to accommodate and 
to meet the fresh requirements of state policies.
 Some Chinese businesses protected their interests by forming 'Ali-
Baba' alliances. 'Ali', or the Malay partner, was the less active or 'sleeping 
partner', contributing only political inﬂuence and connections. 'Baba', 
or the Chinese partner, was the more active half of the alliance, contrib-
uting capital, skills and technical know-how. This kind of partnership 
gave the Chinese access to licenses and lucrative government contracts 
reserved for Bumiputera, especially in the construction, transportation, 
and agricultural wholesaling sectors (Nonini 1983; Jesudason 1989).
One defensive strategy adopted by the Chinese SMEs in the manufac-
turing sector was to split up their existing family-owned companies to 
minimize the effects of ICA regulations. Numerous new companies thus 
maintained a paid-up capital below the ceiling above which a 30 per cent 
Bumiputera share equity would be mandatory. This approach only suited 
low technology and small operations, not the larger enterprises. The de-
fensive action indicated the reluctance on the part of Chinese businesses 
to share with 'outsiders' the hard-earned wealth that they traditionally 
owned and managed under family operations. They also perceived the 
ICA as a threat. In 1971, two-thirds of the manufacturing establishments 
were either sole proprietorships or partnerships and the rest were private 
limited companies, almost all being small-scale, family-run businesses. 
Many of the remaining one third of private limited companies were also 
family-owned ﬁrms (Department of Statistics 1971, quoted in Jesudason 
1989: 139).4 The strategy of splitting up family-owned ﬁrms did not turn 
out well for the Chinese SME manufacturers because the scale of their 
companies came to be constrained by limited family-based capital and, 
operating largely on the fringe of the mainstream economy, was not cost 
effective. Adopting this strategy, however, failed to induce the govern-
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ment to amend the ICA. This is apparent when the world economy began 
to pick up after 1977 and the government successfully brought in foreign 
investors as major players in the manufacturing sector to replace the 
sluggish Chinese investment in Malaysia. Simultaneously, the Malays 
also penetrated the manufacturing sector, steadily increasing their invest-
ment from 40 per cent in 1975 to 56.3 per cent in 1982 (Jesudason 1989: 
145). The ICA stipulations thus severely compromised the integration of 
these Chinese-owned family businesses into the mainstream economy 
from the 1970s to the mid-1980s.
The ICA became a determining factor in the size of Chinese ﬁrms in the 
1970s and 1980s. However, some of these small Chinese family-owned 
ﬁrms were able to expand when the ICA was amended periodically 
in 1977, 1986 and 1990. The 1977 amendment was aimed at creating a 
favourable environment for investment. In the mid-1980s, when the 
Malaysian economy went into recession, the government in late 1985 
liberalized the guidelines for foreign equity ownership in manufacturing 
and held the NEP in abeyance as a way to curb the recession (Khoo 1995: 
136–143). In 1986 the ICA requirement was further relaxed to include 
companies with more than 50 employees and with a paid-up capital 
of more than RM1 million. As the country's economy was beneﬁting 
from accelerating growth, further liberalization of the regulations took 
place in late 1990 to attract more foreign investments. The ICA was 
further amended to include companies with more than 75 employees 
and RM2.5 million in paid-up capital. Nevertheless, over almost two 
decades, the Chinese business community seemed incapable of revok-
ing the ICA. This indicates that Chinese entrepreneurs might be rich 
in cultural resources (ethnic and community-based business networks 
and family business) but their resources were insufﬁcient to counter the 
regulations imposed by the strong state. However, in the context of a 
liberalized economy, Chinese entrepreneurs found their opportunities 
again. While, the ICA regulations continued to affect the Malaysian 
Chinese manufacturers, many chose to make short-term business plans 
in the face of uncertainty regarding their future in Malaysia (Jesudason 
1989: 151–152).
In the wholesale and retail sector, the Chinese SMEs also resorted to 
a defensive strategy to protect their interests, by taking advantage of 
their business networks. Good quanxi (relationships) had been estab-
lished over many years linking customers, wholesalers and retailers in 
a strong network. This network shielded the family-based businesses 
from state and Malay penetration. In 1985, Chinese wholesalers dem-
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onstrated the effectiveness of their commercial network in a serious at-
tempt to ward off state intervention to corner the traditional wholesale 
and retail fruit market for the Chinese New Year festivities (Kuo 1991: 
155–175).  A proactive strategy taken by the Chinese SMEs was to shift 
their investment from high-risk manufacturing to the relatively 'easy 
and safe sectors of expansion' such as commerce, ﬁnance, construction, 
property development, and speculative ventures that generated quick 
returns but were not subjected to ICA stipulations. Hence, Chinese 
investment in the manufacturing sector from 1972 to 1985 fell dramati-
cally for lack of security and conﬁdence in the economic policy of the 
state (Jesudason 1989; Hara 1991; Yasuda 1991). Chinese participation 
in the wholesale and retail and service sectors expanded during the 
NEP period. In 1995, the Chinese owned 81.0 per cent of the wholesale 
establishments compared to 81.8 per cent in 1980 and 66.2 per cent in 
1970. However, during the same period, Bumiputera interests registered 
remarkable progress in the retail sector, with the total establishments 
increasing from 3.0 per cent in 1970 to 34.2 per cent in 1980 and to 37.1 
per cent in 1995 but dropped to 20.4 per cent in 2004. Overall, Chinese 
business networks in commerce have proven resilient in warding off the 
ICA regulations for over two decades. In 1975, Chinese entrepreneurs 
controlled 58.4 per cent of the market share in commerce, increasing to 
61.8 per cent in 1980 and 63.8 per cent in 1990 before declining to 54.8 
per cent in 1995 and then to 50.7 per cent in 2004 (Malaysia 1981: 71; 
1986: 132; 1996: 549; 2006a: 338).5
NDP, NVP, Chinese–Bumiputera Partnerships and Civil 
Societies 
In the context of world economic recession, in 1986 the government 
began to deregulate and liberalize the NEP to support the private sector 
and later, privatization of the public sector. Though the NEP ofﬁcially 
ended in 1990, it was replaced by the National Development Policy 
(NDP, 1991–2000) and followed by the National Vision Policy (NVP, 
2001–2010), which were implemented to further pursue the 'unachieved 
objectives' of the NEP. The NDP and the NVP were without any explicit 
repudiation of the NEP. In other words, the NEP was ostensibly still 
in place. However, the NDP and the NVP emphasized growth and 
modernization, in contrast to the NEP's stress on redistribution. These 
policies are in line with Malaysia's 'Vision 2020' Plan (unveiled in 1991); 
its main goal was for Malaysia to achieve 'fully developed country' 
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status by 2020, mainly by accelerating industrialization, growth and 
modernization. These two policies showed a signiﬁcant shift in the 
government's economic policies towards encouraging inter-ethnic 
business partnerships (Jomo 1994; Gomez & Jomo 1999; Gomez 2003). 
At the level of SMEs, since the mid-1980s, the government also relaxed 
the requirement of the ICA and this resulted in a vast increase of small 
and medium-scale industries, mostly Chinese owned and operated (Lee 
2001: 19). Since 1990, SMEs have no longer been subjected to the ICA 
stipulation of Bumiputera equity participation. This liberalization of 
ICA rules beneﬁts Chinese SMEs that did not have to relinquish equity 
to Bumiputera interests. 
One important macroeconomic strategy of the NDP to keep Malaysia 
internationally competitive was to restructure industry towards more 
technologically sophisticated and better-quality products that are inte-
grated with the markets of developed countries. Amongst the strategic 
thrusts of the NDP, three thrusts were to strengthen the manufacturing 
sector; accelerate the development of science and technology capacity 
and capability to further increase competitiveness and efﬁciency; and to 
increase the use of information and communication technology (ICT) in all 
sectors to increase productivity. These strategic thrusts were important to 
address SMEs' lack of technological know-how, little innovation and the 
low-level application of ICT (Abdullah 1999; Ramayah, Lim & Sulaiman 
2004; Malaysia 2006b;  Hashim 2007; Rosnah, Saberi & Zulkiﬂi 2009).
In line with this strategy and in order to advance the BCIC, the 
government encouraged and provided assistance to Bumiputera entre-
preneurs to venture into the strategic aerospace, automotive, machin-
ery and engineering, petrochemical and telecommunications sectors 
(Malaysia 1996: 13). To enable the transfer of entrepreneurial skills to 
Bumiputera, an important strategy at the micro level was to encourage 
joint ventures with non-Bumiputera or foreign investors. These joint 
ventures were expected to serve as vehicles for the transfer of technical 
and managerial know-how to Bumiputera partners. It was envisaged 
that Bumiputera 'technopreneurs' would become active in sectors such 
as advanced electronics; equipment/instrumentation; biotechnology; 
automation and ﬂexible manufacturing systems; electro-optics and 
non-linear optics; advanced materials and software engineering; food 
production and food processing; aerospace; and optical electronics and 
alternative energy sources (Malaysia 2000: 43). 
The four decades of pro-Bumiputera afﬁrmative action policy had 
transformed many spheres of socio-economic life. Vigorous state-led 
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modernization and economic development managed to produce a new 
Bumiputera entrepreneurial and middle class during this period (Em-
bong 2002; Searle 1999). Four decades of social engineering programs 
have witnessed a signiﬁcant restructuring of the Malaysian society and 
the economic transformation of the Malays. At the same time, there were 
visible changes in the attitude and stance of the Chinese business com-
munity toward their Malay counterparts and in their general acceptance 
of the extension of the NEP (Chin 2004, 2010). Within these political 
and socio-economic contexts, Chinese companies sought to participate 
in government projects by incorporating capable Bumiputera as busi-
ness partners to accommodate policy changes. One of the lasting effects 
of this political and economic scenario was the weakening of the old 
intra-ethnic and family-based Chinese businesses and the formation of 
inter-ethnic ones involving Bumiputera partners. The ICA continues to 
have an impact on the size of SMEs today. Zwart (2006: 96–97) claimed 
that 'all government institutions and government agencies have been 
created to support the development of Bumiputera SMEs and Chinese 
SMEs have been left out in the government's national development 
plan'. The ICA obliged ﬁrms to have a Bumiputera partner on board in 
order to get government tenders. Those who did not want to incorpo-
rate Bumiputera as shareholders decided to look for markets outside 
Malaysia (Zwart 2006: 105). During this period, Chinese capital in the 
form of 'outﬂow direct investment'6 was leaving and going to the re-
gional emerging markets that were more market-friendly than those 
in Malaysia, where afﬁrmative action policy stunted economic growth 
and shunned foreign investors. 
As Bumiputera interests, mostly linked to 'rentier activities', occupied 
an increasingly important role in the economy, Chinese businesses of all 
sizes were challenged and driven to re-position themselves in response 
to the NEP and post-NEP policies and the changing economic climate. 
During the post-NEP period, there were important developments in 
Chinese-Bumiputera partnerships in SMEs in the manufacturing sec-
tor (Mohamed 1994; Chin 2004, 2010). Because of the encouragement 
by the government in the context of economic liberalization, and the 
changing political contexts of the NDP, the ACCCIM and the Chinese 
business community responded in a rational and pragmatic move to 
foster partnerships with Bumiputera entrepreneurs. This was articulated 
by ACCCIM in a working paper on Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera 
partnerships at the Third Bumiputera Economic Congress in 1992 (AC-
CCIM 1992: 1).
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Beginning from 1995, following the establishment of the Genuine 
Joint Venture Promotion Council by the Ministry of Entrepreneur 
Development with the co-operation of the Malay Chambers of Com-
merce Malaysia (MCCM) and ACCCIM, serious attention was given 
to promoting 'genuine joint ventures' in the late 1990s. The role of the 
Council is to encourage integration and close cooperation to expand 
and share experience, knowledge, and expertise between Bumiputera 
and non-Bumiputera. In late 1997, the Council was enlarged to include 
the Malaysian Associated Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(MAICCI), the Ministry of Entrepreneur Development and representa-
tives from a consortium of 20 commercial banks (Malaysia 1998: 34-
35). This partnership, which connects the major ethnic groups and the 
public and private sectors, represented a new approach to accelerate 
the formation of a BCIC as outlined in the NDP. This form of 'ﬁnancial 
and ownership integration' allows Chinese and Bumiputera SMEs ac-
cess to government ﬁnancial aid, easy bank loans and partnerships with 
government-linked corporations. This multi-party partnership matches 
with Searle's (1999) notion of 'capital integration'. Such integration helps 
to accelerate the formation of the BCIC. Between 1995 and 2000, through 
the Council and with co-operation with ACCCIM, MCCM, and MAICCI, 
a total of 54 ofﬁcial joint ventures were approved. The majority of the 
joint-venture companies were SMEs, with 61 per cent of the partnerships 
involved in manufacturing (Malaysia 2000: 36).
To further illuminate the idea of genuine partnership, following are 
two case studies that describe the involvement of knowledge transfer, 
pooling of ﬁnancial resources and involvement of partners in everyday 
business operations.
Case Study 1: Accuracy Engineering
We interviewed Khoo, the co-founder of Accuracy Engineering (AE), in 
June 2006. Khoo and Mahmud were colleagues in their former company. 
Khoo was in the sales division and Mahmud was a technical engineer. 
Khoo invited Mahmud to form AE in 1985 and their partnership con-
tinues today. AE is a moulding, stamping, tooling design, technical 
drawing, material and precision company set up with four partners, 
two Chinese and two Bumiputera. Of these four, two (one Bumiputera 
and one Chinese) are sleeping partners, according to Khoo. Only Khoo 
and Mahmud are active partners. As of December 2006, total Bumi-
putera shareholdings in AE were 36.7 per cent: the Mahmud family of 
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ﬁve holds 25.2 per cent of the total shareholdings of a paid-up capital 
of RM 1.59 million. This undoubtedly is a smart partnership: 98 per 
cent of AE's products are for export and only 2 per cent at most of its 
business dealings are with government bodies. Besides capitalizing on 
Mahmud's technical know-how, another reason for Khoo's partnership 
could be the licensing factor imposed by the ICA. Khoo and Mahmud 
have a good division of labour: Mahmud has a degree in engineering, 
experience in the industry, and is responsible for technical operations. 
Khoo, meanwhile, is responsible for sales and marketing. We visited the 
operations side, and conﬁrmed with staff that the company's general 
manager is indeed a Bumiputera, responsible for production.
Case Study 2: Auto Parts Manufacturing
Auto Parts Manufacturing (APM)—which manufactures auto parts 
for Proton, Perodua, Toyota, Isuzu, Nissan, Hyundai, Mitsubishi and 
Daihatsu—was established by Karim and Hong in 1988. We interviewed 
them in July 2006. Both partners worked for different companies selling 
different products to Proton. Hong had known Karim for about three 
years and found him 'a straightforward man who can be trusted, and 
also enterprising'. Hong therefore suggested to Karim that they should 
start their own auto business. With an initial capital of RM70,000 (Hong 
holding 70 per cent, Karim 20 per cent and another Chinese 10 per cent) 
they started a trading company dealing in auto parts. Their business 
developed into a medium-scale auto parts manufacturing company 
with an annual turnover of RM14 million in 2006 and a pre-tax proﬁt 
of RM269,205. Karim and Hong described how they support each other 
in the business operation. Each has his own set of customers: 
The relationship with customers is unique. I handle a particular person or 
customer and Mr Hong handles his own customers. We fully utilize our 
strength. (Karim)
We share the same authority in managing the company. (Hong)
Mr Hong is in charge of the operational task force with the management to 
support me to deal with the customers and sustain the business. (Karim)
Joint decisions and sharing the responsibility must be there. (Karim)
On nurturing processes, Karim was proud that he had obtained ISO 
status for APM within six months, when other companies usually take 
more than a year. Karim headed the Management Representation (MR) 
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task force and encouraged employees to work more aggressively in 
following ISO procedures:
Karim is the MR and he leads very well and within a short period we got the 
ISO …his humble way helps him to get support from fellow workers and 
customers, he handles them very well. I have to admit he is a good partner, 
he shows no temper and is very hard-working. (Hong)
We can verify this complimentary statement from our own attempts 
to make an appointment with Karim, when his secretary informed us 
that he was in Indonesia for business meetings. After Hong left the in-
terview, we were accompanied by Karim on a visit to the operation line 
and he revealed knowledge of the production operations. He explained 
how the management team had learned from their Japanese customers, 
Daihatsu and Isuzu. One of the improvements made in the production 
line was automation. Karim explained:
I learned more on how to handle the export market from Hong … about 
the requirements that are needed for export and to conform to customers' 
requests … how Hong controls the operation … how he deals with down 
line, areas that I have never learned before.
Another aspect that Karim had probably learned through their part-
nership was managing money, savings and reinvestment: they plough 
proﬁts back into their company. As Karim remarked, 'we developed 
our company to its size today'.     
These joint ventures included manufacturing concerns in which Chi-
nese entrepreneurs had been reluctant to risk their investments because 
of the stringent conditions imposed by the ICA ruling. The willingness 
to invest in the manufacturing sector through partnerships was an in-
dication of the shift in the business strategy of Chinese entrepreneurs. 
Judging from the equity distribution of these joint ventures, it is clear 
that the Bumiputera partners are no longer inactive 'sleeping partners'. 
Many have become owners and managers and are beginning to have an 
impact on the Malaysian business scene. Hence, attempts to nurture joint 
ventures have yielded the desired results in keeping with government 
intentions and the elimination of the so-called 'Ali-Baba' arrangement. 
The true joint venture encourages the development of expertise and the 
sharing of technology between the Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera 
partners. Bumiputera partners always bring political connections and 
access to certain sources of capital. These advantages, along with posi-
tive perceptions of the capability of Bumiputera partners and favourable 
services and facilities provided under the Council have contributed 
much to the success of these joint ventures (Chin 2004 and 2010).
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The New Economic Model, Responses from ACCCIM, 
Perkasa and the SMEs 
This section discusses the introduction of the New Economic Model 
(NEM) announced in mid-2009 and responses from ACCCIM, Perkasa 
and SMEs to it in late 2009 and early 2010. The protracted implementa-
tion of the inter-ethnic pro-distribution policies of the NEP, NDP and 
NVP had caused an unintended consequence, the middle income trap 
(Henderson & Richard 2007). Other problems identiﬁed within this 
period include Malaysia's slowing economic growth since the 1997-
1998 Asian ﬁnancial crisis, stagnation of private investments and lack 
of skilled jobs with high wages. The human capital situation in Malay-
sia is reaching a critical stage where the rate of outward migration of 
skilled Malaysians is rising rapidly (Malaysia 2009: 3-7). Conversely, 
the increasing global economic challenge, especially competition from 
rapidly emerging neighbouring countries coupled with the 2008 global 
ﬁnancial crisis, prompted the government to formulate a New Economic 
Model to move the country forward.
During the Fifth Malaysia Investment Conference on 30 June 2009, the 
prime minister announced the deregulation of 27 services and ﬁnancial 
subsectors7 of the economy. Amongst others was the repeal of the 30 per 
cent Malay equity requirement for Malaysian companies seeking public 
listing and the Foreign Investment Committee guidelines covering the 
acquisition of equity stakes, mergers and takeovers. Ownership in the 
wholesale segment of the fund management industry was also planned 
to be fully liberalized to allow 100 per cent ownership for qualiﬁed and 
leading fund management companies in order to establish operations 
in Malaysia. In the interim, for the retail segment, foreign shareholding 
limits on unit trust management companies were to be raised to 70 per 
cent from their current level of 49 per cent (The Star 2009). 
On 30 March 2010, the government unveiled the NEM, which is an 
ambitious and drastic approach that is envisioned to reduce red tape, 
ensure equal economic opportunities, encourage more private invest-
ment and promote growth in order to get Malaysia out of the middle 
income trap. The NEM identiﬁed Malaysia's competitive position in 
the global economy and recognized the long overdue, unheard voices 
of non-Malays that had been calling for economic and political reform. 
The NEM was formulated to improve Malaysia's economic position, 
to create a pool of good talent, to attract sound investments—to make 
Malaysia a high-income nation. The NEM, once fully implemented, 
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will remove the subsidies under the NEP that have beneﬁted ethnic 
Malays for the past 40 years. The NEM will improve competitiveness 
and eradicate inefﬁcient rent-seeking and patronage behaviour, which 
has enriched only an elite group and has failed to achieve the intended 
aims of the NEP. The NEM will also adopt the concept of inclusiveness 
as its fundamental economic approach, where all Malaysians contribute 
and beneﬁt from economic growth (Malaysia 2010).
The liberalization of the 27 services and ﬁnancial subsectors and the 
NEM create a 'level playing ﬁeld' of opportunities for all entrepreneurs 
of all races. These are signiﬁcant milestones for enhancing Malaysia's 
competitiveness in the global economy. These new measures received 
positive responses from the Chinese business community represented 
by the ACCCIM but negative responses from Perkasa, which represents 
the interests of Malays and Muslims.   
The NEM, which promotes economic liberalization, has received a 
positive response from the Chinese business community. The ACCCIM 
perceived the policy as laissez-faire by expanding the scope of markets 
and providing more open and equal access to opportunities. The AC-
CCIM, in its ofﬁcial response to the NEM, stated:
…the New Economic Model (NEM) was very comprehensive, firstly 
identifying the distortions and hindrances in the market place arising 
from regulatory, bureaucratic and unfair competition especially from 
GLCs (Government Linked Companies). The emphasis of the NEM on the 
Government being a facilitator and being market friendly, transparent based 
on merit, competition augers well for the future prospects for Malaysia. 
The frank realization of past implementation of well designed policies that 
did not beneﬁt those who are genuinely in need and creating a culture of 
rent-seeking and patronage is bold and truthful thus allowing the NEM to 
address and improve the implementation giving all Malaysian hope for 
a more open and equitable access to opportunities and good prospects to 
build a prosperous and inclusive nation… The divestments of non-core 
assets by GLCs and Government Agencies should be widened to remove 
special privileges, licenses and monopolistic conditions enjoyed unfairly 
by such bodies thereby shielding them from inefﬁciencies and competition. 
(ACCCIM 2010)
Conversely, some measures in the NEM, especially those concerning 
Malay rights, have been received with strong reservations by certain 
quarters of the Malay community. In particular, the Malay Consulta-
tive Council (comprising 76 Malay NGOs), led by Perkasa, has strongly 
reacted to 'defend' Malay rights and Islam. It attacked the NEM for its 
lack of a Malay agenda and ambiguity in the afﬁrmative action policy. 
Perkasa wants to retain the 'spirit' of the NEP in the NEM. Its president, 
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Ibrahim Ali, questioned the NEM: 'Where is the stake for the Malays 
in the distribution of the country's economic cake? What's important is 
fairness and not equity. If strategic areas are developed under the open 
tender system, the Malays will not be able to compete' (The Star 2010a). 
By asking such questions, Perkasa actually suggested that a community 
is entitled to the national economic pie purely based on their numbers 
within the nation. This also implies that Perkasa's stance to maintain the 
afﬁrmative action policies that concern Bumiputera rights and preserve 
existing distribution policies under the NEP and against the merit-based 
and needs-based system introduced under the NEM, could reinforce 
the dependency syndrome of Bumiputera.
The former prime minister, Mahathir Mohamed, adopted an evasive 
position in an interview with Reuters, which said that the govern-
ment needs to push ahead with reforms and at the same time engage 
Perkasa. Perkasa also criticized and condemned outright the calls by 
the ethnic-based political party, the Malaysian Chinese Association 
(MCA), for economic liberalization, namely for the government to 
lower the 30 per cent equity for Bumiputera. The MCA called instead 
for a merit-based and needs-based system to eliminate the depend-
ency syndrome (The Malaysia Insider 2010). Perkasa is worried that 
the NEM will increase the monopoly of the country's economy by the 
Chinese community. The president of the Penang Malay Chamber of 
Commerce also backed Perkasa's stance to continue these afﬁrmative 
action policies (The Times 2010).
The radical measures of the NEM could remove the patronage sys-
tem that has been enjoyed by many Bumiputera entrepreneurs. For 
example, the special privileges, licenses and monopoly conditions 
enjoyed by the GLCs have crowded out some local SMEs and stiﬂed 
entrepreneurship. Under the NEM, the divestments of non-core as-
sets by GLCs will open up more opportunities for non-Malay local 
SMEs, but Malay-owned SMEs that have enjoyed certain protected 
industries will face more competition. Thus, it is seen as a threat to the 
Malay agenda because GLCs are the major shareholders of corporate 
equity. Conversely, non-Malay company owners will no longer be 
able to depend on working with inﬂuential Bumiputera and for GLCs 
to help protect their interests by obtaining sub-contracts or becoming 
suppliers of goods and services. Responses from the Malay groups 
characterized a social protection stance that tries to limit the scope of 
market forces and centres on securing social rights, in opposition to 
the laissez-faire system.
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The NEM, which emphasizes the concept of inclusiveness and the 
more open and equal access to the economy, is a difﬁcult challenge. It 
was blocked by Perkasa and its supporters, which has become a stum-
bling block to the realization of the NEM. The NEM Part II, announced 
in February 2011, clearly engaged Perkasa's demands. The NEM Part 
II clearly contradicts the prime minister's '1Malaysia' concept because 
it reintroduces the NEP's 30 per cent Bumiputera equity target with no 
expiry date. This revised reform policy will cause sceptical investors to 
turn to other destinations for their investments. The scenario could be 
even worse, with the continuous exodus of human capital and greater 
outﬂow of capital as already identiﬁed in the NEM. Since Chinese capital 
is dominant in SMEs, especially in manufacturing, if the state were to 
continue with a pro-distribution policy, it is very likely to see a negative 
trend in the development of SMEs.
The NEM clearly gives more attention to SMEs. Altogether, 15 govern-
ment ministries and 38 agencies are involved in supporting the devel-
opment of SMEs. In addition, approximately 30 government programs 
help SMEs (Malaysia 2009: 122). To ensure that the growth of SMEs 
is synchronized with the NEM, for the ﬁrst time an 'SME Masterplan' 
(2012-2020) has been formulated to help accelerate the growth of SMEs 
through comprehensive action. The master plan aims to transform SMEs 
by providing ﬁnancial support in the form of debt and equity investment 
in potential SMEs and provide technological support with the potential 
for innovation. Also, it aims to help SMEs grow beyond the domestic 
market by emphasizing innovations and new technology as strategies 
for growth and development. In addition, it recognizes that the growth 
of large ﬁrms and global giants creates a need for clusters and critical 
masses of SMEs to support their growth and creativity (Malaysia 2010: 
33-36). Initiatives and programs formulated under the SME master plan 
are strategic to address the constraints and challenges of Malaysian 
SMEs, especially the increased competition from economic liberalization 
and globalization that affect the competitiveness of Malaysian SMEs in 
the E&E industry that make up Malaysia's most important manufactured 
export (Chin 2006; Tham 2001). 
The NEM notes that Malaysia should build on its advantages; one of 
them is Malaysia's leadership in the E&E manufacturing that attracts 
investment from multinational corporations (MNCs). The E&E sector 
spawns the growth of other sectors in supply, logistics and services 
(Malaysia 2009: 8). Moreover, the Malaysian E&E industry is a major 
part of MNCs' supply chains in East Asia. Once a Malaysian company 
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successfully plugs into global supply chains, it would have the advan-
tage of scale and branding that would be difﬁcult for competitors to 
dislodge (Malaysia 2010: 11). 
The E&E sector is facing a shortage of local talent. This issue has been 
in existence for quite a while following a long period of the NEP and 
post-NEP distributive policies plus the migration policy (Henderson & 
Richard 2007). The inward migration policy has made the Malaysian 
E&E industry continue to depend on cheap, low-skilled foreign work-
ers. Conversely, four decades of afﬁrmative policy favouring Malays 
caused an outward migration of talent, especially among non-Malays. 
The perpetuation of these policies came with social and economic costs. 
The people that left Malaysia are usually those who possessed skills, 
knowledge and wealth. This caused a shortage of talented human 
capital, which became the main stumbling block for technology upgrad-
ing in the electronics sector and led MNCs to perceive Malaysia as a 
low-end production base depending on the inward migration of cheap 
and unskilled workers. The present government is trying to overcome 
this problem by establishing the Talent Corporation8 to retain highly 
skilled human capital and encourage Malaysian professionals overseas 
to return home. 
The E&E industry in Malaysia has developed into a major global 
manufacturing base. According to the Malaysian Industry Development 
Authority's record, there are approximately 1,695 E&E companies in 
Malaysia with a total investment of RM13.2 billion (US$4.4 billion) for 
the year 2010 and a workforce of more than 336,000 people. The gross 
output of this sector totalled RM166.2 billion (US$55.8 billion) in 2010 
(Malaysia 2011). Responding to increasingly competitive global supply 
chain production, Malaysian companies have gradually moved up the 
value chain into the manufacturing of high-end products, and some 
have even moved away from labour-intensive to more capital-intensive 
operations. As the Malaysian economy is export-oriented and integrated 
into the global economy, two case studies of SMEs in the E&E industry 
are chosen to understand their constraints, challenges and prospects.
Case Study 3: CS Technology
I interviewed the founder CS Technology (CST) in August 2010. CST 
specializes in the development, manufacture and marketing of intelligent 
machine vision systems, which was facing a shortage of human capital. 
CST's problem reﬂects the general constraint caused by brain drain in 
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Malaysia. Generally, workers in SMEs lack the skills and knowledge 
necessary for their respective work. It was reported that 350,000 Ma-
laysians in 2008 lived and worked abroad, half of them with university 
education (Business Times 2010)9. Ong, the founder of CST, has been 
working with the engineering and physics faculties at Universiti Sains 
Malaysia (USM) in Penang on a number of joint research projects. Ong 
was informed by a professor that ﬁrst-class engineering students were 
recruited to work in Singapore, Taiwan and China before they stepped 
into the local job market. Ong's job offer of US$950 per month (equivalent 
to MNCs' offers) to some top local engineering graduates was declined, 
as offers from Singaporean companies were more attractive. Ong af-
ﬁrmed that some graduates do not even take up offers from MNCs in 
Penang but rather choose to work in Singapore for US$2,000 to US$2,450 
per month. Hong Kong is even higher, where top graduates can easily 
earn about US$3,500 per month. It is very difﬁcult for local companies, 
especially SMEs, to recruit talented workers. Most SMEs do not offer 
high pay compared with MNCs. This situation reinforces the escalat-
ing brain drain problem that Malaysia is facing. According to Ong, the 
quality of engineering graduates has dropped so much that they do 
not ﬁt well into SMEs. Furthermore, SMEs do not have the luxury of 
providing training; even MNCs nowadays are not willing to provide 
training to new graduates. SMEs, especially in the E&E subsector, are 
competing with MNCs and large-scale industries for skilled workers as 
well as for professionals. Often, SMEs have difﬁculties hiring and retain-
ing talent because MNCs and large-scale industries are better placed to 
offer generous compensation packages to attract more skilled workers, 
while SMEs have to settle for others. 
To retain Malaysia/Penang as a favourite destination for MNCs, 
state-funded training institutions such as the Penang Skills Develop-
ment Centre play an important role in providing semi-skilled and skilled 
workers that match the demands of the industry. To further overcome 
the shortage of human capital, Ong provides on-the-job training to in-
terns from local universities for 3–6 months and recruits the best ones 
when they are in their ﬁnal semesters. 
CST was established in 2001 in Penang. It started as an original brand 
manufacturer, which is in the highest value chain of the E&E industry, 
dealing directly with customers and controlling its production proc-
esses. CST employs 50 workers at its Penang plant and has an ofﬁce in 
Shanghai. The company commands a certain level of branding reputa-
tion in several countries. It exports about half of its products to China, 
_________________________________________________________________________29
________________________________ Evolution of Malaysia's Development Strategies
Thailand, the Philippines, Taiwan, the US, Costa Rica and Germany. 
From Ong's experience as an engineer in an MNC, he asserted that Pen-
ang's E&E sector is still not moving out of manufacturing, not moving 
into design and rapid prototyping, for example, to attract high-value 
foreign direct investment.
Ong realizes that his company cannot escape the brain drain prob-
lem and the value chain effect in which his company cannot meet the 
requirements of his customers that are mostly MNCs. However, he has 
overcome this in his own way. CST moves ahead in technology utili-
zation and development by collaborating with experts from USM and 
rides on the university's advanced technology for high-end research. 
It collaborates with the physics faculty of a university because it has a 
very advanced laboratory, including a RM200 million piece of equip-
ment that has a molecule breakdown system. Ong claimed that even 
MNCs in Penang do not have such high-end equipment and they have 
to rent it from USM because offshore MNCs will not invest that heavily 
in their local sites, except in their home countries. Ong asserted that new 
graduates and postgraduates that have had this high-tech exposure are 
very much in demand by MNCs abroad. However, Ong has been trying 
to recruit top graduates through his collaboration with USM.
Ong claimed that it is no longer easy to make high proﬁt margins 
from MNCs: 
Today, MNCs don't spend money on testing compared with the past. 
Previously, MNCs had budgets for testing prototypes. Now, SMEs have to 
bear the cost of testing prototypes. SMEs can't absorb these expenses and 
testing durations; you will die if you put on 2–3 systems and they don't 
buy. MNCs only spend on cloning, not on development and manufacturing 
at offshore sites. Capital is needed and risk is high to invest in building a 
prototype, which is only for customers to test it.
Case Study 4: SD Engineering
I interviewed Suresh, owner of SD Engineering in July 2010. SD Engi-
neering is a software design, precision engineering and tooling company 
in Penang that coped well with the 2008 economic crisis. In terms of 
revenue and proﬁt, his company survived the crisis. Suresh asserted 
that manufacturing activities related to his business such as precision 
engineering, injection moulding and die-casting in Penang had run at 
full capacity in 2009. However, the proﬁt margin in this sector is not 
as good as it was in the early 1990s (45 per cent) and today it is only 
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10–15 per cent. His company's capital expenses have been reduced ow-
ing to difﬁculties in getting a bank loan. According to Suresh, MNCs 
are cutting budgets; because of increased steel prices, they rework old 
moulds. MNCs are also now subcontracting their jobs to large-scale 
local companies, and these companies then subdivide the contracts to 
smaller companies; thus, the proﬁt margin has dropped. MNCs' jobs are 
also being reduced because Vietnam and Thailand are more attractive. 
Furthermore, the E&E and related industries are facing a shortage of 
skilled labour. To compete for jobs in a narrowing market, he attracts 
customers by improving his company's technology and being innova-
tive and creative.
The greatest constraint he faces is the difﬁculty recruiting skilled 
and talented workers. Consequently, he set up a software company in 
Chennai, India where graduates with relevant knowledge and skills are 
plentiful. Moreover, Suresh claimed that Malaysian graduates request 
US$830 for starting pay. Conversely, in Chennai there is a large pool of 
better quality graduates who are well equipped with knowledge to work 
and the starting salary is just US$580. For his precision and injection 
moulding business, jobs that require less knowledge and lower tech-
nology are sent to China and are then shipped back to Penang for ﬁnal 
'touch-up' and 'branding'. Suresh stressed that Penang lacked skilled 
workers and had higher labour and material costs.
Conclusion
The historical development and changes in the Malaysian economic 
policies at different stages illuminate institutional innovations as a re-
sult of a complex historical interplay among the state, the economy and 
civil societies. The changing political and socio-economic policies had 
a negative impact on the scale of production and direction of Chinese 
SMEs in the manufacturing sector during the NEP period. It severely 
compromised the integration of Chinese family businesses into the 
mainstream economy from the 1970s to the mid-1980s. At the same 
time, the policy created a dependency syndrome amongst Malays in 
the form of Ali-Baba partnerships that remain in practice today in the 
Malaysian economy.  
The implementation of the protracted inter-ethnic distributive policy 
into the NDP and NVP periods, coupled with a migration policy that 
depends on cheap and unskilled labour, caused the middle income trap 
and brain drain problems. These policies kept Malaysian E&E companies 
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in low-technology production and with low-cost jobs given by MNCs to 
local SMEs. Local SMEs not only suffer from a lack of technology transfer 
from MNCs in the supply chain but also suffer from the lack of human 
capital to develop and sustain their competitiveness levels in the global 
economy. These constraints have contributed to the underdevelopment 
of SMEs, especially Chinese SMEs that are capable of linking with MNCs 
and maximizing the beneﬁts of foreign direct investment (Henderson & 
Richard 2007). However, some government incentives have managed to 
encourage some SMEs to participate in technology-intensive activities, 
particularly in process technology (Rasiah & Krishnan 2008: 78) and 
keep the industry striving.
Conversely, the pro-distributive socio-economic policies were success-
ful in restructuring Malaysian society and managed to social-engineer a 
Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community that has encroached 
especially into the wholesale and retail sector. From the positive re-
sponses of the economic-based Chinese and Malay civil societies to the 
government initiatives during the NDP period, a new form of formal 
smart partnership between the Chinese and Bumiputera took place and 
witnessed more Bumiputera forays into the manufacturing sector. Nev-
ertheless, the sector of industries involved in this form of partnerships is 
not directly integrated into the global supply chain as compared to the 
E&E industry. The state has attempted to be innovative in its economic 
policies to develop Bumiputera entrepreneurs and at the same time to 
stay competitive in the global economy but it has to overcome its greatest 
political hurdle to achieve its 'complete innovation'. Malaysian SMEs may 
not remain competitive if new initiatives such as the NEM, propelling 
the country to be competitive in the global economy, are blocked by a 
stalemate of competing social forces such as Perkasa.
New measures under the NEM could create a new set of economic 
behaviours that feed back into the political system. These new meas-
ures might also shape the forms of enterprises that emerge under the 
NEM. Their competitiveness depends on whether the NEM encourages 
efﬁciency in the allocation of resources and provides equal opportu-
nities to all. Thus, the competitiveness of Malaysian SMEs will most 
probably be enhanced along with the implementation of new market-
driven measures if it goes according to plan. Three areas where the state 
should improve are technology, education and R&D infrastructure to 
constantly provide sophisticated levels of support for SMEs, especially 
in the E&E industry. Being situated in Southeast Asia, in the region of 
emerging markets, the prospect for Malaysian SMEs is bright and they 
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would thrive if pro-market policies are guaranteed by the state to help 
shore-up investor conﬁdence.
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NOTES
1  The author acknowledges with thanks Universiti Sains Malaysia, which provided 
a research grant (1001/PSOSIAL/816006) that has resulted in this article.
2  The deﬁnition of SME used in this article is derived from the National SME De-
velopment Council (Malaysia 2005b). The criteria used to deﬁne SMEs are based 
on annual sales of between RM200,000 and RM25 million and number of full-time 
employees between 5 and 150 people. According to the Census of Establishments 
and Enterprises (Malaysia 2005a), SMEs in Malaysia accounted for 99.2 per cent or 
518,996 of total establishments. In terms of employment, Malaysia's SMEs generated 
jobs for approximately 3 million workers (65.1 per cent of the total employment of 4.6 
million) in 2003 (Normah 2006: 5). SMEs have demonstrated their signiﬁcance to the 
Malaysian economy as indicated by their contribution to output and value added, 
RM405 billion and RM154 billion respectively in 2003. In terms of share contribution, 
SMEs accounted for 43.5 per cent of total output and 47.3 per cent of value added. 
In terms of contribution by sector, SMEs in the services sector contributed 56.7 per 
cent of output and 54.7 per cent of value added (Malaysia 2005b).
3  The ACCCIM is the parent organization of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 
Malaysia. It has 17 constituent members located separately in the 13 states of the 
nation (ACCCIM 2009: 128). Up to 2006, it represented about 28,355 Malaysian Chi-
nese companies, individuals and trade associations in particular, and the Chinese 
business community in general (ACCCIM 2006). In terms of companies, more than 
90 per cent of these members are in the SME category.
4  A local press report in 1972 showed that an estimated 120,000 Chinese business 
establishments in peninsular Malaysia comprised 71 per cent of the total. Amongst 
them, 65 per cent or 78,000 establishments were retail shops and 12 per cent were 
wholesale outlets. The annual turnover of some retail shops was less than RM10,000 
and many supposed 'big' shops failed to gross RM500,000. In the wholesale busi-
ness, average sales volume was small, about 40 per cent achieving an annual sale 
turnover of not more than RM100,000 (Nanyang Siang Pau, 16 February 1978).
5  Figures from 1975 refer to Peninsular Malaysia only and ﬁgures for 1980-95 refer to 
Malaysia.
6  In the period from 1985 to 2005, the Malaysian private sector invested US$3.832 billion 
in China (China Statistical Yearbook 2006). The Chinese Embassy in Malaysia stated 
that by the end of June 2002, a total of 2,359 Malaysian companies and individuals 
would have invested in numerous projects in China. The Embassy conﬁrmed that 
about 90 per cent of Malaysian investments in China have come from local Chinese 
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businesses (Lee and Lee 2006: 167). In the period from 1988–2006, Malaysian invest-
ment in Vietnam amounted to US$1.6 billion, mainly from the Chinese (Malaysia 
2008). 
7  In short, the core of the 27 subsectors are: computer and related services, health and 
social services, tourism services, transport services, sporting and other recreational 
services, business services, rental/leasing services without operators and supporting 
and auxiliary transport services (PMO, 22 April 2009).
8  For more details on the Talent Corporation, visit http://www.talentcorp.com.
my/.
9  According to the World Bank, Malaysians residing overseas numbered only 9,576 
in 1960 and by 2005, the number rose to 1,489,168, an almost 100-fold increase over 
the 45-year period (The Star 2010b).
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